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ABSTRACT 
Certain members of a population consciously and deliberately decide to take joint action to provide particular types 
of goods or services that are at least partly excludable and at least partly congestible because it is too costly to 
provide such goods individually. These goods are called club goods or collective goods. We first define some key 
concepts in club theory and public choice. This includes the prospects for determining the optimal level of 
membership of a club, how to determine the optimal level and range of provision of services by a club, and 
consideration of the dynamics of club membership. Then we examine the ways in which club theory can help 
provide an alternative approach to recognising and overcoming market failure in agricultural and food value chains. 
We note that useful insights can be gained by considering value chains as ‘latent clubs’. That is, they are systems 
that exist which are either inactive or have not been fully developed, but which have the potential for improvement 
through collective action. If value chain members do exploit an opportunity to reap the rewards of collective action, 
then forming a club that comprises the whole chain or a subset of chain members offers an efficient organisation 
design to do so. We find that all of the calculus that has been identified for clubs can be applied to agricultural and 
food value chains. However, there are two particular issues that require further consideration. One is the nature of 
risk in agricultural value chains, and how it is related to member preferences, and the other is the form of collective 
action to be taken by agricultural value chains in the future. 
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1 Introduction 
Successful value chains create and increase chain surplus, where chain surplus is defined as the 
difference between aggregate customer value and the cost to the value chain of meeting their customers’ 
requirements (Chopra and Meindl, 2013, p.3). As described by Mounter et al. (2016a, p. 1), to do this 
they must spend time and effort on designing and planning how their chain will be structured and 
operated. This might be done by a chain governor acting on behalf of all participants (such as an industry 
organisation), by a dominant firm (say a large manufacturer or retailer), or in some countries, by a 
government institution. Alternatively, it might be done collaboratively through all partners contributing 
to the chain vision. Whichever way it is done, it is a complicated process, especially in global value chains 
with many firms and many channels, so value chain coordination procedures and the governance 
mechanisms that sit behind them are of critical importance. 
Because of this complexity, the ability of food value chain participants to benefit from creating value is 
constrained by the potential for misalignment between the financial incentives for individual firms and 
the collective incentive for the whole chain. This misalignment is similar in some ways to, but different in 
other respects from, the typical under-investment in public goods found in the general economy or in ‘old 
world’ commodity markets (Griffith et al., 2015).  
Thus, market failure abounds in agricultural and food value chains. Typical areas of value chain 
organisation and operation prone to market failure include the following: 
• Strategic research, development and extension,  
• Regulation of markets and transactions within the value chain, 
• Enhancing consumer and channel knowledge,  
• Chain sustainability,  
• Education and training in value chain analysis, operation and management, and 
• Chain governance and relationship management.  
 
While such a list provides a useful means to assess where intervention and/or investment is needed and 
justified, the usual approaches to recognising and countering these market failures tend to be piecemeal 
and independent, without a clear focus on overall chain surplus (see also the related discussion in Griffith 
et al., 2017). A more systematic approach is required. 
Our objective in this paper is to examine the ways in which club theory can help provide an alternative 
approach to recognising and overcoming market failure in agricultural and food value chains. In the next 
section, we define some key concepts in club theory and public choice. This includes the prospects for 
determining the optimal level of membership of a club, how to determine the optimal level and range of 
provision of services by a club, and consideration of the dynamics of club membership. In section 3 we 
examine how the theory of clubs can be applied to understand and explain collective action in an 
agricultural and food value chain.  Section 4 examines further issues for consideration, while the paper 
ends with conclusions in section 5. 
2 The Theory of Clubs 
History 
Sandler and colleagues (for example Cornes and Sandler, 1996; Sandler and Tschirhart, 1997; Sandler, 
2013) have been reviewing this area of the literature for many years. In the most recent paper, he 
documented the almost 50 year history and rationale of club theory, demonstrating how its application 
can inform a wide range of collective actions that benefit club members. He identified influential thinkers 
about the theory of clubs, most notably Buchanan (1965) who is credited with developing the concept. 
But at the same time, Olson (1965) was coincidently writing about collective action by groups (see also 
Olson and Zeckhauser, 1967; Cooper, 1967), and earlier writers such as Tiebout (1956), Wiseman (1957) 
and Mohring and Harwitz (1962) were analysing related issues in the area of public expenditures. Sandler 
(2013) also described a wide range of applications of the theory of clubs, including jurisdictional design, 
highways and other transport infrastructure, military alliances, recreation, telephone systems, global 
communication networks and dealing with intergenerational issues.  
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Key concepts in club theory 
What is a club? A Buchanan club is defined as ‘a decentralized, voluntary organization sharing an impure 
public good that is excludable and congestible’ (Sandler, 2013, p.281)2. Another definition is that a club is 
‘a voluntary group deriving mutual benefits from sharing one or more of the following: production costs, 
the members’ characteristics, or a good characterized by excludable benefits’ (Sandler and Tschirhart, 
1980, p.35). So a club is an entity (an organisation, a group, an institution) but the formation of the entity 
is tied closely with the nature of the “public” goods and services that the entity provides.  
Also, while its voluntary nature is a defining characteristic of a club, some form of compulsion may be 
involved to prevent free-riding. This usually involves some form of membership fee which allows entry 
into the club and the goods and services it provides. 
There are several other concepts closely related to the formation of a club. One is that of an 
“encompassing group” (Olsen, 1965). According to McGuire (2015, p.40), “An encompassing group 
internalizes in its own decision calculus a portion of the costs and benefits its actions impose upon the 
economy in which it is embedded. If a group is completely or perfectly encompassing, it will include 
calculation of all the benefits and costs its actions impose on the entire economy, and thus will impose no 
distortions on that economy; instead in this case it will perfectly represent or reflect the economic 
interests of everyone.” 
Another is that of “collective” or “joint” action. Collective or “consciously pursued joint action” is action 
taken jointly by independent entities in whose interest it is to do so to achieve a common goal or for 
competitive advantage but for whom, individually, the costs of taking such action outweigh the individual 
benefits. Ostrom (2002, p.5) observed that ‘all collective action problems share an initial characteristic 
that excluding non-contributors to a collective benefit is a nontrivial cost’. Collective action leads to the 
notion of “collective efficiency” (Schmitz, 1995). 
A third related concept is that of a “strategic alliance”. Varadarajan and Cunningham (1995, p.282) 
defined a strategic alliance as ‘the pooling of specific resources and skills by the cooperating 
organisations in order to achieve common goals, as well as goals specific to the individual partners’. Some 
of these goals may relate to the provision of excludable and partly congestible public goods, and 
elsewhere we have shown that strategic alliances fit under the broad umbrella of clubs (Malcolm et al., 
2017). 
Finally, the idea of a “hybrid” organisation or institution is relevant here. Hybrid institutions are “complex 
organisational forms [with] many stakeholders performing jointly tasks that neither the market nor the 
individual firm can achieve.” (Carbone, 2017, p.1).  Carbone goes on to argue that food supply chains 
should be framed as hybrid institutions (p.20). 
To summarise, certain members of a population consciously and deliberately decide to take joint action 
to provide particular types of goods or services that are at least partly excludable and at least partly 
congestible because it is too costly to provide such goods individually. These goods are called club goods 
or collective goods. Thus a club good is ‘a partly rivalrous public good, characterized by excludable 
benefits’ (Sandler, 2013, p.267). According to Sandler (2013, p.68), ‘club goods must possess some rivalry 
and sufficient excludability’. A collective good is a public good ‘defined with respect to some specific 
group’ in a population (Olson, 1971, p.14). Olson observed that ‘some goods are collective goods to those 
in one group and at the same time private goods to those in another, because some individuals can be 
kept from consuming them and others can't’ (Olson, 1971, p.14). Sandler (2013) pointed out that ‘club 
goods do not encompass all impure public goods, where benefits are partly excludable and/or partly 
rival’. The defining difference is the ability of clubs to operate ‘a sufficiently inexpensive exclusion 
mechanism to charge users for the congestion that their use causes’ (Sandler, 2013, p.268). 
A categorisation of the various types of public and private goods is provided in Table 1.  
                                                 
2 See the glossary at the end of the paper for related definitions. 
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Table 1. 
Nine Types of Private and Public Goods 
Pure private good Impure public 
good/club good
Common 
resource
Impure public 
good/club good
Impure public 
good/club good
Impure public 
good
Quasi-public 
good
Impure public 
good
Pure public good
Excludable Non-Excludable
Rivalrous
Partly
Rivalrous
Selectively 
Excludable
Non-
Rivalrous
 
Source: Adapted from Hubbard et al. (2012, Figure 15.7). 
 
Pure private and pure public goods are in the top left and bottom right corners respectively. A quasi-
public good, which is non-rival and excludable, is in the bottom left corner, and a common resource, 
which is rival and non-excludable, is in the top right corner. The other five categories are all impure public 
goods – some combination of at least selectively excludable or at least partly rivalrous. According to the 
definitions given above, three of these are where club goods reside – some combination of at least 
selectively excludable and at least partly rivalrous. 
Olson (1965) (cited by McGuire, 2015, p.36) outlined five factors for considering ‘the crucial dimensions 
along which analysis of voluntary provision of public goods must be pursued’ (that is, the provision of a 
club good). These criteria, which have been used by a number of researchers (for example, Cornes and 
Sadler (1996)) are: 
(1)  the size of the group (club);  
(2)  disparities in income and preferences among group (club) members; 
(3)  openness or closedness of the group (club) to new members – which he called “inclusive” or 
“exclusive”; 
(4)  the fashion in which individual contributions are settled, involving such issues as sequence of 
allocative moves, possibility of re-contracting, bargaining, commitment, and repetition; and  
(5)  the effect of joint provision or tying of a private good to a public good limited to members of the 
group (club) which thereby holds the membership captive – issues we now call impurities or 
imperfections in publicness (McGuire, 2015, p.36). 
Determining the optimal level of membership of a club 
Siqueira (2001, p.383) observed that ‘club theory is consistent with the voluntary approach to the 
provision of collective goods … [and] provides an analytical framework for demonstrating that collective 
goods can be provided according to first-best principles, without the need of a central government’. This 
analytical framework provides a sound basis on which to determine the optimal level of membership of a 
club. 
The basic first-best principles originally spelt out by Buchanan (1965) were reproduced by Sandler (2013, 
pp.268-272). Sandler noted that ‘Clubs are replicable and partition the population into a set of clubs, 
each with the optimal number of members’ (Sandler, 2013, p.268) whose utility functions can be 
specified. Members’ utility increases by consuming more private and club goods as the cost of supplying 
club goods declines with increased membership, but decreases beyond some membership level as 
congestion sets in (although this decline is possibly offset by the internalization of network externalities). 
Sandler specified the resulting first-order conditions as a provision and membership condition where the 
marginal rates of substitution and transformation between private and club goods are equated. He 
interpreted these conditions to mean that ‘each member equates the marginal benefit of the club good, 
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evaluated in terms of the numéraire, to the marginal cost of the club good’ (Sandler, 2013, p.269). The 
optimal membership size and the optimal provision of services are co-determined.  
Sandler (2013, pp.273-274) broached the important topic of member heterogeneity, a vital consideration 
for considering clubs in food value chains. He quoted McGuire (1974) who “… demonstrated that his clubs 
cannot optimally accommodate different types of individuals. This follows because members must utilize 
the entire quantity of the club good. To accommodate different tastes, utilization patterns of members 
must be allowed to differ, which comes with more advanced models …”. Without this accommodation, 
McGuire correctly indicated that clubs must be segregated with identical members. So what has started 
as an innocuous assumption has become an implication that could mistakenly direct policy to segregate 
clubs.  
More recent studies have developed ways of accounting for the heterogeneity of club members. Sandler 
(2013, section 5) acknowledged that ‘most real-world clubs … serve members, who possess dissimilar 
tastes and needs’. He went on to explain how these varied tastes and needs could be accounted for in an 
efficient manner: “These differences primarily manifest themselves in terms of varied utilization. An easy 
way to accommodate heterogeneous or ‘‘mixed clubs’’ is with a single club that serves a subset of the 
population, who are members … The optimal membership requirement distinguishes members from non-
members; that is, those individuals with the greatest willingness to pay join the club until membership 
charges outweigh membership benefits… The toll condition is the key new ingredient for mixed clubs. All 
members pay the same congestion-internalizing toll when crowding is anonymous, but the total tolls paid 
by each member vary according to their revealed visits. … Thus, total tolls are individualized based on 
revealed use.” 
Sandler (2013, section 5) makes a strong distinction between anonymous and non-anonymous crowding: 
“When members’ attributes affect crowding, crowding is non-anonymous and tolls must be tailored to 
the user” (DeSerpa, 1977; Glazer et al., 1997). Under these circumstances, club design becomes more 
difficult. Consider a learned society. Really smart or accomplished members may offer more positive 
externalities from their presence than any crowding that they cause, so that their membership fee or toll 
may be negative, resulting in a subsidy! Most members of the society have to pay tolls because their 
crowding dominates. In some clubs, the refinement of the notion of a visit may be a more practical means 
to account for non-anonymous crowding. … even non-anonymous crowding can sometimes be 
circumvented through provision decisions (i.e., club goods tailored to the members’ attributes) or finer 
utilization measurement.” 
A problem frequently encountered in clubs is asymmetric information, which can lead to an expansionary 
bias in club membership, a notion originally put forward by Sandler and Tschirhart (1997) and supported 
by Siqueira (2001) on the basis that ‘agency costs increase the overall cost of provision and therefore 
tends to raise the benefit of cost sharing among members’ (Siqueira, 2001, p.383). 
Determining the optimal level and range of provision of services by a club 
A club can determine the optimal level of provision of goods or services by employing a two-part tariff. It 
provides a means to maximise the extraction of consumer surplus by the club from its members and is an 
important way for a club to satisfy the wants and utilities of heterogeneous sets of members. In most 
clubs, members vary in the services they require and in the levels of impact that particular forms of 
market failure have on their welfare. This is perhaps the main source of breakdown of club cohesion 
where some members feel that they receive little benefit from their membership while seeing other 
members benefit greatly. While this source of perceived inequity will never be totally removed, a flexible 
club is able to provide a variety of services that enable members to choose those services that best suit 
their purpose, thereby substantially alleviating the problem. The more heterogeneous the membership of 
a club, the lower the membership fee is likely to be and the more varied the services offered to overcome 
the various forms of market failure. On the other hand, efficiency of provision of services suggests a 
smaller rather than larger number (Cook, 1995; Royer, 1999). Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2001, p.388) 
provide a simple example of an optimal two-part tariff. 
The quality of club governance is crucial. Moral hazard, often interacting with transaction costs, principal-
agent problems and information asymmetry, can lead to free-riding and over-servicing in clubs. Siqueira 
(2001, pp.384) made the following observations in this respect: 
“… in clubs where multiple visitation is feasible, the absence of monitoring or implementing a per-visit fee 
by club officials due to high transaction costs can lead to increased utilization of the club by users … . 
Even in the absence of multiple visits, if exclusion and monitoring are relatively costly so that these 
activities are imperfectly implemented, there exist temptations for potential users to free ride, to use the 
Euan Fleming et al. / Int. J. Food System Dynamics 9 (2), 2018, 166-177 
171 
club without paying … even where exclusion is relatively costless, problems of moral hazard are still likely. 
For instance, in clubs with a manager or operator in charge of services or maintenance, their actions or 
effort may be imperfectly observable or not verifiable by third parties. In such situations, where the 
manager is risk averse, this leads to more than just the usual trade-off between weak incentives and 
reduced risk sharing on one hand and strong incentives and increased risk sharing on the other. Because 
of the possibility of cost sharing among members, increased costs associated with higher power 
incentives can be shared among more members, but this in turn, tends to be offset by increased crowding 
or congestion.” 
Siqueira also noted that where club members cannot closely monitor a club manager’s actions or efforts, 
and where the manager is risk-averse, a challenge lies in getting the manager to fulfil their contract 
requirements ‘and shifting some of the burden of risk towards the agent’ (Siqueira, 2001, p.384). He 
observed that the ‘increased cost of providing the agent with stronger performance incentives can be 
offset per member through increased cost sharing [but] this needs to be weighed against the tendency 
towards more crowding … as a result of increased membership’ (Siqueira, 2001, p.384). 
Dynamics of club membership 
Being a member of a Buchanan club is a voluntary choice, unless members collectively vote to do 
otherwise, and being a member implies that the benefits flowing from the membership outweigh the 
costs incurred. If the costs of taking collective action outweigh the benefits received, then voluntary 
members will choose to cancel their membership. This might be due to changes in the value of the club 
good relative to the value of the same good acquired privately, changes in club fees and charges, changes 
in the tastes and preferences of the member, or changes in club rules such that non-anonymous crowding 
becomes an issue. Thus, movement in and out of clubs over time is commonplace.  
Some clubs might be seen as essentially permanent business structures. This might happen because the 
market failure leading to the creation of the club is of such importance or of such scale that a major 
institutional response is required. Multinational defence treaties, multinational free trade agreements 
and the like are the extreme examples. For these types of clubs there is often the need to have formal 
legal agreements and a strong government legislative framework. On the other hand, many clubs are set 
up with short life spans to meet a specific need. Here the market failure leading to the creation of the 
club might be of low importance or the scale of the failure might be localised. A small group of members 
might then get together, agree on a solution and finance and implement it, and then disband. The same 
group might reform to tackle the next issue, or a new combination of members might emerge. 
Disparate members’ objectives or interests may contribute to instability in membership, and hence in the 
capacity to generate fees to maintain services or raise capital for investments. Varied interests might 
represent commercial variety – members or potential members recognise or value services differently – 
or temporal variety – members’ discount rates differ over time.  Especially for long-lived clubs, dealing 
with intergenerational issues is crucial. Intergenerational clubs are clubs where “[m]ultiple generations of 
members share the club good, which is subject to atemporal crowding and intertemporal depreciation 
[degradation of the club good through its use]” (Sandler, 2013, p.280). The same set of issues that might 
lead voluntary members of a club to choose to cancel their membership are relevant for intergenera-
tional choices, especially the notion of different members of different ages having markedly different 
tastes and preferences.   
3 Agricultural and Food Value Chains as Clubs 
In his review of almost 50 years of club theory, none of the examples provided by Sandler (2013) 
mentioned agricultural or food value chains or anything close to them in terms of the nature of their 
operations. But we believe that useful insights can be gained by considering value chains as ‘latent clubs’. 
That is, they are systems that exist which are either inactive or have not been fully developed but which 
have the potential for improvement through collective action. Club theory, then, could be applied to 
examine ways to increase the value added (surplus) of an agricultural or food value chain by collective 
action taken within a club format. 
A value chain is a latent club in the sense that its members are independent entities that interact with 
each other – exchanging information, inputs, services and products – but need not engage in collective 
action even though they have the potential to do so. So long as they interact as independent entities, 
they would not take actions that are privately unprofitable but which are profitable to them as a group or 
sub-group in the chain, thereby forgoing collectively profitable opportunities. If members do exploit an 
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opportunity to reap the rewards of collective action, then forming a club that comprises the whole chain 
or a subset of chain members offers an efficient organisation design to do so. 
A typology of clubs in food value chains may include the following five elements: 
1. Horizontal clubs comprise entities that take collective action across a single cross-section or an  
aggregate of multiple cross-sections in the value chain3. 
2. Vertical clubs comprise entities that form a strategic alliance for collective action along a single value  
chain within a network of chains. 
3. Clubs may focus on a single product in the value chain (say, bread wheat) or multiple products (say,  
 bread wheat and durum wheat). 
4. Clubs may focus on a single activity (say, R&D) or multiple activities (say, R&D and certification for  
 food safety) in taking collective action. 
5. Clubs may vary according to which firms in the chain could potentially collaborate. 
 
This means that the appropriate composition of such clubs may vary, from whole-of-chain membership to 
horizontal or vertical strategic alliances existing within parts of the chain. As noted above, a strategic 
alliance is a generic concept in strategic management of which clubs may be considered to be a sub-set 
(Malcolm et al., 2017). Whole-of-chain membership of a club is only likely to be feasible and profitable in 
very simple food value chains. 
If value chains can be considered as clubs, then the concepts of chain goods and chain failure follow 
(Griffith et al., 2015, 2017; Malcolm et al., 2017). A chain good (a club good in a value chain) is partly 
rivalrous and selectively excludable within that value chain; and chain failure is a failure to achieve 
economic efficiency in a value chain because of imperfections in market mechanisms that prevent the 
optimal provision of chain goods. And while market failure often results from failure to internalise social 
externalities, chain failure often results from failure to deal with chain externalities. 
A unifying feature of our presentation of agricultural value chains as clubs is the endogenous adoption of 
collective modes of operation. Adoption centres on net benefits in terms of reduced transaction costs 
and internalised externalities. Adoption of the club model, however, entails a number of management 
steps associated with achieving club formation, maintaining club membership, and achieving club 
sustainability and viability.  Each step has implications for members’ fee structures and for levies on 
subgroups of members for receipt of specific club functions. 
Fee structures, continuing the earlier discussion of two-part tariffs, might be set in agricultural value 
chains in association with up-front fixed fees to enable functionality in fundamentals such as production 
and market access, while variable fees might refer to the costs of delivery into markets. For longer term 
investment, levies on the membership will avoid fragmentation only where variation in member type is 
managed: Cook (1995) referred to producer co-operative fragmentation where “horizon” and “portfolio” 
problems were not overcome.  Horizon is associated with disparate club members’ tastes for the future, 
notably that long term investments may offer little appeal to club members near retirement, so they will 
be unlikely to receive the services generated from current investment. Portfolio recognises member 
differences on one hand: some services are more lucrative or less risky than others and club members will 
know this to varying degrees; and accounts for risk on the other: club members may manage their own 
portfolios of activities and use diversification in risk management, but clubs themselves are steeped in a 
fee-for-service model that solely satisfies member demand. Royer (1999) has argued this risk perspective 
as being influential in sustainability of farm co-operatives.  
All of the calculus mentioned above that has been identified for clubs can be applied to agricultural and 
food value chains. However, in doing so, the form and operation of value chain governance is crucial (see 
for example Microlinks, n.d.; Carbone, 2017). This refers to the relationships among the buyers, sellers, 
service providers and regulatory institutions that operate within or influence the range of activities 
required to bring a product or service from inception to its end use. Governance is about power and the 
ability to exert control along the chain - at any point in the chain, some firm (or organization or 
institution) sets and/or enforces parameters under which others in the chain operate. 
Thus, following Sandler (2013), it would be technically feasible for the chain governor to specify a 
provision and membership condition where the marginal rates of substitution and transformation 
                                                 
3 There is a synergy here with club goods provided in a spatial context. There is a growing literature on both clusters being 
set up as clubs to provide whole-of-cluster goods and services, and local public goods provided by local government 
authorities. See Mounter et al. (2016b) for a review. 
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between private and chain goods are equated. This can be done by employing a two-part tariff, which 
both allows the means to maximise the extraction of consumer surplus from chain members and satisfies 
the wants and utilities of heterogeneous sets of members. This is especially found in agricultural and food 
value chains in which there is a throughput of many differentiated products. Many value chain service 
providers have a flat fee for the basic or minimum level of service, and add-on fees for higher levels of 
service. 
Thus a chain governor, like a club manager, is able to provide a variety of services that enable members 
to choose those services that best suit their purpose.  This focus on clubs’ production and delivery of 
services is indicative of club function rather than form, and our discussion has stayed clear of advocacy of 
forms beyond the schematic specification of a club typology in food value chains as outlined above. Form 
may well be simultaneously a generator and a result of governance, as agricultural value chain 
characteristics such as transaction network configuration, ownership of unique resources and demand for 
information all position or require governors in the chain. Risk in agricultural value chains may best be 
treated this way, in particular by subsets of club members voluntarily assuming risks in return for profit 
and by club fragmentation being a consequence of the risks being unable to be beneficially internalised 
either as an externality or as a transaction cost. 
4 Issues Requiring Further Analysis 
If in an agricultural and food value chain there are recognised impediments to the maximization of chain 
surplus, there are a number of options available to value chain participants to overcome these 
impediments.  In some situations and in some environments, governments may be called on to intervene, 
while in other cases a dominant firm such as a large retailer might choose to implement a new policy or a 
new practice that becomes “the new rules of the game”. Other options relate to negotiated outcomes 
between value chain partners. But how do value chain partners choose which option would best suit 
them? We argue that such choices do occur, and that they are optimal responses to chain failure based 
either around transaction cost theory or the internalisation of an externality. 
In the discussion above we have argued that various alliances within a food value chain are often formed 
endogenously in a club structure with the aim of overcoming chain failure, if sufficient information is 
available so that the marginal rates of substitution and transformation between private and chain goods 
are equated. Whether such a club needs to be formed to deal with the chain failure, or whether private 
actions among chain members (a Coasian solution) would be sufficient to avoid its occurrence, revolves 
around the issue of transaction costs. If a private solution is taken (the benefits of private action 
outweigh the transaction costs to them), with a view to maximizing their private profits, there is no 
commitment about the impact on chain surplus and chain governance concerns do not arise. This is 
simply a private commercial negotiation between two parties to a transaction. 
According to Dahlman (1979, pp.161-162), a Coasian solution “… explicitly attempts to ascertain the 
economic consequences of alternative ways of organizing the allocation of resources. The analysis thus 
directs attention to the point that institutions fulfill an economic function by reducing transaction costs 
and therefore ought to be treated as variables determined inside the economic scheme of things. The 
question then ultimately becomes: how can the economic organization be improved upon by endogenous 
institutional rearrangements?” 
Coasian solutions often do not work to the benefit of the whole of society, and in our case particularly to 
members of the food value chain, especially if the assumptions of perfect information and equal 
bargaining power do not hold. On the issue of perfect information, Hahnel and Sheeran (2009) made the 
important point that the application of Coase's theorem relies on negotiation in a situation of incomplete 
information rather than a market solution, and outcomes depend on factors such as the relative 
bargaining strength of the parties, the milieu in which their negotiations take place, the frequency with 
which they take place, and the potential for applying different aspects of game theory. Not only does 
complete information have to be available to both sides of a negotiation, but also it has to be common 
knowledge to avoid perverse incentives being created that adversely affect others (in our case, other 
members in the value chain). A priori, the limitations of a Coasian solution make it likely that a club 
solution would be more efficient and equitable, but that may not always be the case. 
In circumstances where transaction costs outweigh the benefits from chain partners pursuing a Coasian 
solution, the formation of a club – either across the whole chain or a designated part thereof – may 
enable transaction costs to be reduced across all interested parties to a point where they are now 
outweighed by the benefits of joint action. 
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Risk in agricultural value chains has occupied some of the narrative of our paper, in association with 
member preferences. Two key risk considerations then remain unexamined.  First is the static effect of 
the extent or nature of risk on the nature of clubs formed; and second the more dynamic effect of 
iterative development of clubs to accommodate and allocate risk. Further analysis of these situations is 
likely to be highly context-specific, particularly with regard to the nature of final consumers’ demand and 
the governance exerted in the chain. 
Another area of contention for food value chains as latent clubs concerns the variety of power 
relationships within a food value chain. It is particularly of concern where oligopsony and oligopoly are 
present in those food value chains. 
5 Conclusions 
An advantage of using club theory rather than the more pragmatic strategic alliance framework to study 
the operation of a food value chain is its rigorous analytical framework to: (1) determine the optimal 
number of clubs, club size, level of provision of services within a club and fee structure for heterogeneous 
club members; and (2) identify chain failure and the potential for its removal or alleviation by providing 
chain goods, eliminating chain bads, and internalising chain externalities. 
The basis for our approach in this paper is that, in respect of food value chains, Pigouvian taxation is not 
the sole means of internalising an externality and that the provision of goods and services that possess 
public good attributes need not be the sole province of governments. This is to say, first, endogenous 
adjustment of actors within food value chains can align marginal benefits and marginal costs of service 
delivery, and, second, that club operation delivers both the costs and the benefits to members who are 
simultaneously payers of costs and receivers of benefits. 
Such endogenous forces of adjustment can and do overcome entry and maintenance costs to bring the 
club into being by way of two-stage tariffs. We have associated these with the two fee-paying regimes of 
agricultural production and marketing, being lump sum payment and volume-based payments.  Various 
emphases on these two represent approaches to achieving and using economics of scale, and so refer to 
the size of club and its relationship to fee types and levels. 
Beyond size and cost structure, stability of clubs is implicated by the tension between club member 
variety in objectives and unanimity in demand for club services. We have extended agricultural co-
operative research work in terms of horizon and portfolio problems as fragmentation mechanisms for 
clubs. We also suggest that interpretation of the correction of chain failure as a club function assists in 
explaining sustainability and stability of agricultural value chains. Members’ nuanced understanding of 
the benefits of club membership – i.e. collective action – puts an effective brake on fragmentation and 
guides club managers or their analogous agricultural value chain governors. 
Our proposed typology of club-motivated agricultural value chains exists in an iterative arrangement 
alongside past collective action, both successful and unsuccessful, and possible future collective action.  
Those in the past have disintegrated due to forces of scale, technology and consumer tastes, while those 
in the future are subject to the same influences. Club design, particularly its mix of services and fee setup, 
may harness such disruptive forces. 
Our discussion presents a club as a structure with much to advocate for agricultural value chains.  
However, our discussion is not one of form but rather of function. The form to be taken by collective 
action in the future by agricultural value chains is generally of less interest to stakeholders than is the 
functionality of value addition and its allocation among members of a club or chain. 
References 
Buchanan, J.M. (1965). An economic theory of clubs. Economica, 32: 1-14. 
Carbone, A. (2017). Food supply chains: coordination governance and other shaping forces. Agricultural and 
Food Economics, 5 (3): 1-23. 
Chopra, S., Meindl, P. (2013). Supply Chain Management: Strategy, Planning, and Operation. 5th edition, 
Pearson, Harlow. 
Cook, M.L. (1995). The future of U.S. agricultural cooperatives: A neo-institutional approach. American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics, 77 (5): 1153-1159.  
Euan Fleming et al. / Int. J. Food System Dynamics 9 (2), 2018, 166-177 
175 
Cooper, R.N. (1967). Collective goods, comparative advantage and efficiency: Comments.  In R.N. McKean 
(Ed.), Issues in Defense Economics. National Bureau of Economic Research, Columbia University Press, 
New York, pp 51-57. 
Cornes, R., Sandler, T. (1996). The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods. Cambridge University 
Press, New York, NY. 
Dahlman, C.J. (1979). The problem of externality. Journal of Law and Economics, 22 (1): 141-162. 
DeSerpa, A. (1977). The Coase Theorem: a diagrammatic presentation. Economic Inquiry, 15 (4): 562-573. 
Glazer, A., Niskanen, E., Scotchmer, S. (1997). Club theory symposium. Journal of Public Economics, 65: 1-88. 
Griffith, G., Gow, H., Umberger, W., Fleming, E., Mounter, S., Malcolm, B., Baker, D. (2015). Refocussing on the 
value chain perspective to analyse food, beverage and fibre markets. Australasian Agribusiness 
Perspectives Paper 104. Available at : https://www.agrifood.info/perspectives/2015/Griffith_et_al.pdf 
Griffith, G., Fleming, E., Mounter, S., Malcolm, B., Umberger, W., Baker, D. (2017). Chain failure and chain 
goods: re-thinking value chain upgrading in developing countries. International Journal on Food Systems 
Dynamics, 8 (2): 146-154. 
Hahnel, R., Sheeran, K.A. (2009). Misinterpreting the Coase theorem. Journal of Economic Issues, 43 (1): 215-
238.  
Harrison, G.W. et al. (1987). Coasian solutions to the externality problem in experimental markets. Economic 
Journal, 97: 388-402. 
Hubbard, R.G., Garnett, A.M., Lewis, P., O’Brien, A.P. (2012). Microeconomics. 2nd edition, Pearson, Sydney. 
Malcolm, B., Griffith, G., Fleming, E., Mounter, S. (2017). Chain failure theory as a framework for evaluating 
horizontal and vertical strategic alliances among food value chain participants: A red meat industry 
perspective. Australian Farm and Business Management Journal, 14 (Paper 4): 48-63. 
McGuire, M.C. (1974). Group segregation and optimal jurisdictions. Journal of Political Economy, 82: 112–132. 
McGuire, M.C. (2015). Remembering Mancur Olson: And Auld Lang Syne. Downloaded 23 February 2016 from: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/291357299_Remembering_Mancur_Olson_And_Auld_Lang_Syne 
Microlinks (n.d.). Value chain governance – overview, USDA. Downloaded 24 February 2016 from: 
https://www.microlinks.org/good-practice-center/value-chain-wiki/value-chain-governance-overview 
Mohring, H.D., Harwitz, M. (1962). Highway Benefits: An Analytical Review. Northwestern University Press, 
Evanston, IL. 
Mounter, S., Griffith, G., Fleming, E. (2016a). Achieving better strategic fits and higher surpluses  for Australian 
beef value chains by recognising and countering chain failure. Animal Production Science. Available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/AN15460. 
Mounter, S., Fleming, E., Griffith, G., and Grant, B. (2016b). Industry clusters and food value chains: Can the 
literature on local collective failure be used as a guide for assessing and overcoming value chain failure? 
Australasian Agribusiness Perspectives, Paper 114.  
Available at: http://www.agrifood.info/perspectives/Mounter_et_al.pdf 
Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Olson, M., Zeckhauser, R. (1967). Collective goods, comparative advantage and efficiency. In R.N. McKean 
(Ed.), Issues in Defense Economics. National Bureau of Economic Research, Columbia University Press, 
New York, pp 25-48. 
Ostrom, E. (2002). Type of good and collective action. Paper presented at a Workshop in Political Theory and 
Policy Analysis, Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change, Indiana 
University. Downloaded 24 February 2016 from: 
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/8102/Elinor_Type%20of%20Good%20and%20Coll
ective%20Action.pdf?sequence=1 
Pindyck, R.S., Rubinfeld, D.L. (2001). Microeconomics. 5th edition, Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ. 
Royer, J.S. (1999). Cooperative organizational strategies: A neo-institutional digest. Journal of Cooperatives, 14: 
44-67.  
Euan Fleming et al. / Int. J. Food System Dynamics 9 (2), 2018, 166-177 
176 
Sandler, T. (2013). Buchanan clubs. Constitutional Political Economy, 24 (4): 265-284. 
Sandler, T., Tschirhart, J.T. (1997). Club theory: Thirty years later. Public Choice, 93: 335-355. 
Schmitz, H. (1995). Collective efficiency: Growth path for small-scale industry. Journal of Development Studies, 
31 (4): 529-566. 
Shapiro, C., Varian, H.R. (1999). Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy. Harvard 
Business School Press, Boston, MA. 
Siqueira, K. (2001). Clubs and the cost of agency. Public Choice, 107: 383-393. 
Tiebout, C.M. (1956). A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of Political Economy, 64: 416-424. 
Varadarajan, P.R., Cunningham, M. (1995). Symbiotic marketing revisited. Journal of Marketing, 50: 7-17. 
Williamson, O.E. (1981). The economics of organization: The transaction cost approach. American Journal of 
Sociology, 87 (3): 548-577.  
Wiseman, J. (1957). The theory of public utility price: An empty box. Oxford Economic Papers, 9: 56-74. 
Glossary of Terms 
Pure public good: A pure public good is non-rivalrous and non-excludable. 
Impure public good: An impure public good satisfies the criteria of a public good in being non-rivalrous 
and non-excludable to some level but not completely. 
Non-excludable good: A good is excludable if somebody can be prevented from using it. Conversely, ‘If 
the benefits of a good are available to all once the good is supplied, then its benefits are non-excludable’ 
(Sandler, 2013, p.265). 
Non-rivalrous good: A good’s benefits are non-rival when a unit of the good can be consumed by one 
individual without detracting, in the slightest, from the consumption opportunities still available for 
others from the same unit. Non-rivalry means that the marginal cost of extending the good’s benefits to 
another consumer is zero (Sandler, 2013, p.265). 
Congestion (crowding): ‘Crowding or congestion involves a detraction in a club good’s quantity or quality 
from increased utilization by the sharers. … The presence of congestion means that the extension of user 
rights to another individual implies a nonzero marginal cost, which, in turn, justifies the need to restrict 
users or members. In contrast, there is no need to restrict the number of consumers for a non-rivalrous 
good, because society prospers from extending consumption to anyone who obtains a positive marginal 
benefit.’ (Sandler, 2013, p.266). 
Anonymous crowding: crowding in a club caused by members who cannot be distinguished from other 
members. 
Non-anonymous crowding: crowding in a club caused by members’ attributes (Sandler, 2013, p.275) and 
these members can be identified.  
Free-rider problem: The free-rider problem occurs when those who benefit from resources, goods, or 
services do not pay for them, which results in an under-provision of those goods or services. According to 
Sandler (2013, pp.265-266), ‘Nonexcludability of nonpaying benefit recipients leads to the free-rider 
problem’, which requires club intervention to prevent its occurrence assuming the transaction costs of 
intervention do not outweigh the benefits from resolving the problem. 
Collective efficiency: Schmitz (1995) defined collective efficiency as ‘the competitive advantage derived 
from local external economies and joint action’. 
Coasian solution: A Coasian solution is an agreement reached between parties that is attained by means 
of a mutually advantageous bargain between them (Harrison et al., 1987, p.388). 
Network externality: A network externality or network effect is “… the effect that one user of a good or 
service has on the value of that product to other people. When a network effect is present, the value of a 
product or service is dependent on the number of others using it.” (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). 
Transaction costs: ‘Transaction costs represent resource losses due to imperfect information’ (Dahlman, 
1979, p.148). The three types of transaction costs typically mentioned in the literature – search and 
information costs, bargaining and decision costs, and policing and enforcement costs – reduce to this 
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simple definition according to Dahlman (1979). Williamson (1981) identified the key determinants of 
transaction costs as frequency, specificity, uncertainty, limited rationality and opportunistic behaviour. 
Two-part tariff: A club membership fee is charged and, in addition, prices are paid by members for 
specific services that the club offers. 
Toll: a fixed charge for the right to consume a specified good or service, traditionally used as a term for 
the price paid for using transport infrastructure. 
